Abstract This paper provides a logical framework for comparing inductive capabilities among agents having different background theories. A background theory is called inductively equivalent to another background theory if the two theories induce the same hypotheses for any observation. Conditions of inductive equivalence change depending on the logic of representation languages and the logic of induction or inductive logic programming (ILP). In this paper, we consider clausal logic and nonmonotonic logic programs as representation languages for background theories. Then we investigate conditions of inductive equivalence in four different frameworks of induction, cautious induction, brave induction, learning from satisfiability, and descriptive induction. We observe that several induction algorithms in Horn ILP systems require weaker conditions of equivalence under restricted problem settings. We address that inductive equivalence can be used for verification and evaluation of induction algorithms, and argue problems for optimizing background theories in ILP.
content and identifying different information sources. In program development, one program may give a declarative specification of some problem and another program may give an efficient coding of it. In this case, equivalence of two programs guarantees a correct implementation of the given specification. In the context of logic programming, various criteria for equivalence relations are proposed in the literature (Maher 1988; Sagiv 1988; Lifschitz et al. 2001; Eiter and Fink 2003; Inoue and Sakama 2004) . Among them, weak equivalence and strong equivalence of two programs are particularly important. Two logic programs P 1 and P 2 are (weakly) equivalent if they have the same declarative meaning. On the other hand, two programs P 1 and P 2 are strongly equivalent if they preserve the equivalence relation by the introduction of arbitrary rules R to them.
Equivalence relations presented above compare capabilities of deductive reasoning between programs. For instance, two Horn logic programs are weakly equivalent if they have the same least model that is the logical consequences of each program. When we consider realizing intelligent agents that can perform commonsense reasoning, however, comparing capabilities of non-deductive reasoning between programs is also necessary and important. Recently, Inoue and Sakama (2005 , 2006a , 2006b ) argue equivalence in abductive logic. They introduce two different types of abductive equivalence: explainable equivalence and explanatory equivalence. The former considers whether two theories have the same explainability for any observation, while the latter considers whether two theories have the same explanation contents for any observation. These two notions compare capabilities of abductive reasoning among agents, and they provide necessary and sufficient conditions for abductive equivalence in first-order logic and abductive logic programming (ALP) (Denecker and Kakas 2002) . Induction is also known as non-deductive reasoning, which is often distinguished from abduction (Flach and Kakas 2000) . In computational logic, induction is realized by inductive logic programming (ILP) (Muggleton 1992; Nienhuys-Cheng and De Wolf 1997) . A typical induction problem is to build a hypothesis which covers a given observation with respect to a background theory. Then, there are some questions concerning equivalence issues in induction.
When can we say that induction with a background theory is equivalent to induction with another background theory?
Two different background theories B 1 and B 2 are considered equivalent if they induce the same hypothesis H for any observation O. This equivalence measure is useful for comparing "information contents" of different background theories.
When can we say that induced hypotheses are equivalent to another induced hypotheses?
Two hypotheses H 1 and H 2 are considered equivalent if they account for the same observation O with respect to a background theory B. This equivalence measure is useful for comparing "explanation power" of different hypotheses.
When can we say that induction from an observation is equivalent to induction from another observation?
Two observations O 1 and O 2 are considered equivalent if they produce the same hypothesis H with respect to a background theory B. This equivalence measure is useful for comparing "evidential power" of different observations.
Do conditions for these equivalence differ by underlying logics?
The results of induction and equivalence conditions generally depend on a logic on which induction is based. Moreover, those conditions differ among individual induction algorithms. Then, we can compare different logics or algorithms for estimating their induction capabilities.
These issues are important and meaningful for comparing different induction tasks, but few studies have argued the problems so far. In this paper, we focus on the question (1) above and study the problem of equivalence of background theories in induction. To answer the question (4), we also investigate conditions of equivalence in different logics and induction algorithms. Other problems, concerning the questions (2) and (3), are studied in a different paper (Sakama and Inoue 2009a) .
To formalize the problem, we introduce the notion of inductive equivalence between background theories. A background theory B 1 is said inductively equivalent to another background theory B 2 if B 1 and B 2 induce the same hypothesis H for an arbitrary observation O. Intuitively, if an agent has a background theory B 1 which is inductively equivalent to another background theory B 2 of another agent, then these two agents are considered equivalent with respect to inductive capability. In this case, we can identify those two agents as far as induction is concerned. From the viewpoint of program development, if a theory B 1 is transformed to another syntactically different B 2 , inductive equivalence of two theories guarantees identification of results of induction from each theory. This provides guidelines for optimizing background theories in ILP. The problem of interest is logical conditions for inductive equivalence in ILP. Conditions for inductive equivalence differ depending on logics of representation languages and logics of induction. This paper considers two logics for representation languages -clausal logic and nonmonotonic logic programming. These logics are widely used in knowledge representation and ILP (Muggleton 1992; Baral and Gelfond 1994) . On the other hand, we consider four different frameworks of induction, cautious induction, brave induction (Sakama and Inoue 2009b) , learning from satisfiability (De Raedt 1997; De Raedt and Dehaspe 1997a) , and descriptive induction (Lachiche 2000) . These frameworks capture different aspects of induction problems. We show necessary and sufficient conditions for inductive equivalence under different semantics in respective induction. We also observe that some induction algorithms in Horn ILP systems require weaker conditions of inductive equivalence. We address that inductive equivalence is used for testing correctness/completeness of an induction algorithm and comparing capabilities of different algorithms. We also argue problems for optimizing background theories in ILP through appropriate program transformations. This paper is a revised and extended version of . The differences between the present work and the previous one are follows. First, we apply the framework of inductive equivalence to different types of induction, and investigate formal properties among them. Inductive equivalences for cautious induction, brave induction, and learning from satisfiability are new in this paper. Second, inductive equivalences in particular induction algorithms are also revised and extended. Inductive equivalences in FOIL and BRAIN not are new in this paper. Third, previous results for inductive equivalence in nonmonotonic logic programs are generalized to background theories which possibly contain disjunctions. Fourth, new considerations and additional arguments are added throughout the paper.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents logical frameworks used in this paper. Section 3 introduces the notion of inductive equivalence and investigates formal properties in clausal logic. Section 4 verifies conditions of inductive equivalence in some Horn ILP systems. Section 5 applies inductive equivalence to nonmonotonic logic programs. Section 6 discusses related issues and potential applications. Finally, Section 7 concludes the paper.
Logical framework

Clausal theories
A first-order language consists of an alphabet and all formulas defined over it. The definition is the standard one in the literature (Nienhuys-Cheng and De Wolf 1997, for instance).
A first-order theory is a set of formulas. A clause is a formula of the form
where A i (1 ≤ i ≤ n) are atoms and every variable appearing in (1) is universally quantified at the front. A clausal theory (or simply a theory) is a set of clauses. The clause (1) is also written as
in the context of logic programming. 
The set of all models of T is written as Mod(T ).
The semantics of a theory T is represented as a subset SEM(T ) of Mod(T ), i.e.,
SEM(T ) ⊆ Mod(T ).
The set SEM(T ) represents models that are selected from Mod(T ) based on some preference criterion. In particular, SEM(T ) = Mod(T ) holds under the classical model theory of first-order logic. A theory T is consistent under SEM if SEM(T ) = ∅; otherwise, T is inconsistent. A theory T satisfies a clause C (written as T |= C) if C is satisfied in every model of T . T satisfies a set S of clauses (written as T |= S) if T |= C for any clause C in S. There are several criteria for selecting models as SEM(T ). Among them, minimal models are often considered in the literature. The set of all minimal models of T (denoted by MM(T )) is defined as
Every consistent clausal theory has a minimal model (Bossu and Siegel 1985) .
Logics of induction
There are several definitions of induction. In this paper, we consider the following four different frameworks of induction:
-Cautious induction (Sakama and Inoue 2009b In each case, we say that a hypothesis H covers (or explains) O with respect to B (under SEM) in the induction framework I . H is also called a solution in I . Here, I is one of the four induction frameworks presented above. In this paper, cautious induction, brave induction, learning from satisfiability, and descriptive induction is respectively abbreviated as CauInd, BraInd, LFS, and DesInd.
Cautious induction requires an observation to be satisfied in every model in SEM(B ∪ H ). In particular, when SEM(B ∪ H ) = Mod(B ∪ H ) in first-order logic, it is written as
In this case, cautious induction is also called explanatory induction (abbreviated as ExpInd) (Flach 1996) , which is known as usual setting in ILP (Muggleton 1992; Nienhuys-Cheng and De Wolf 1997) . Brave induction, on the other hand, requires that an observation is satisfied in some models in SEM(B ∪ H ). By the definition, brave induction is weaker than cautious induction, that is, if H is a solution of cautious induction, it is also a solution of brave induction, but not vice versa. Learning from satisfiability is weaker than brave induction, so that it provides the weakest form of induction among those three frameworks. Brave induction and learning from satisfiability coincide when SEM(B) = Mod(B). That is, O is satisfied in some model of B ∪ H iff B ∪ H ∪ O is consistent. Descriptive induction, which is also called confirmatory induction (Flach 1996) , prescribes that a hypothesis is satisfied in a background theory and an observation. In contrast to explanatory induction, it does not intend to learn classification rules but seek regularities over observed data. When an observation is given as a set of interpretations, descriptive induction is also called learning from interpretations (De Raedt 1997; De Raedt and Dehaspe 1997b) . . . , euro(20), asia(21), . . . , asia(27), usa(28), . . . , usa(30) } where each number represents individual students. Put the semantics of the background theory as the minimal model semantics, SEM(B) = MM (B) . First, consider the set H 1 of the following clauses
Then, H 1 is a solution of BraInd, CauInd, and LFS, but it is not a solution of DesInd. Next, consider the set H 2 which consists of the single clause
H 2 is a solution of BraInd, LFS, and DesInd, but it is not a solution of CauInd. Finally, consider the set H 3 which consists of the single clause
H 3 is a solution of DesInd and LFS, but it is not a solution of BraInd nor CauInd.
Thus, four induction frameworks provide different solutions in general.
Equivalence relation
Two different theories are equivalent in many ways. In this paper, we handle three different notions of equivalences. Consider two theories T 1 and T 2 which have the common underlying language. Then, T 1 and T 2 are -logically equivalent (written as
By the definition, T 1 ≡ s T 2 implies T 1 ≡ w T 2 . In particular, three equivalence relations coincide in first-order logic under the condition SEM(T ) = Mod(T ) (Eiter and Fink 2003) . We first show that logical equivalence coincides with strong equivalence when
Proposition 2.1 Let T be a clausal theory and HB its Herbrand base. For any
is consistent, assume that M is not a model of T . Then, there is a clause C in T which is not satisfied by M. In this case, M * ∪ {C} is inconsistent. This contradicts the fact that 
In this case, the following relations hold:
Here, T 2 ≡ s T 3 because the addition of Q = {a, b} makes T 3 inconsistent.
Inductive equivalence in clausal logic
Inductive equivalence
We first provide a general framework of inductive equivalence between two theories. By the definition, inductive equivalence presents that two background theories have the same explanation contents for any observation. Note that there are at least three different parameters on which inductive equivalence depends-(i) syntax of B, H and O, (ii) the underlying semantics SEM, (iii) and the framework of induction I . In this paper, we study several cases of inductive equivalence with different parameters.
The notion of inductive equivalence is applied to four induction frameworks as follows. 
Proposition 3.1 (Relations between different inductive equivalences) For any SEM, the following relations hold.
Proof The results of (1) and (2) (2) show that the implication relations among three induction frameworks are inherited to equivalence relations. On the other hand, Proposition 3.1(3) represents that in the context of inductive equivalence, distinction between cautious induction and descriptive induction is unimportant. With this reason, we mainly consider inductive equivalence in cautious induction, brave induction, and learning from satisfiability, hereafter.
Inductive equivalence between clausal theories
In this section, we consider the following problem setting: -a background theory B is given as a clausal theory -an observation O is a set of clauses -a hypothesis H is a set of clauses We first set SEM(B) = Mod(B), i.e, the classical semantics in first-order logic. In this case, cautious induction coincides with explanatory induction, and brave induction coincides with learning from satisfiability, as presented in Sect. 2.2. Necessary and sufficient conditions for inductive equivalence are stated below. 
By Theorems 3.2 and 3.3, the following result follows.
Corollary 3.4 (Inductive equivalence in cautious induction and brave induction) For any two clausal theories B 1 and B
By the fact that descriptive induction is identified with cautious induction (Proposition 3.1), we conclude that the inductive equivalence relations in four different induction frameworks coincide under the classical semantics.
Next, we set SEM(B) = MM(B) for the semantics of a clausal theory B. This setting is considered as the minimal model semantics of disjunctive logic programs (Minker 1982) or circumscription (McCarthy 1980) . In this case, we have the next result. Proof Suppose that B 1 and B 2 are inductively equivalent under the minimal model semantics in CauInd. Then, for any set O and for any set H of clauses, O is satisfied by Deciding the inductive equivalence of two theories is intractable in general. Proof Given two propositional clausal theories B 1 and B 2 , the problem of testing B 1 ≡ B 2 is equivalent to the problem of testing unsatisfiability of (B 1 ∧ ¬B 2 ) ∨ (¬B 1 ∧ B 2 ), which is coNP-complete. Then, the result follows by Theorem 3.8. Next, given two Horn logic programs B 1 and B 2 , B 1 ⊃ B 2 is checked by testing unsatisfiability of B 1 ∪ {¬ c} for each clause c ∈ B 2 . As Horn SAT is linear, this is done in quadratic time. The converse implication is checked in the same manner.
Inductive equivalence in Horn ILP systems
There are many ILP systems which use Horn logic programs as background theories. In these systems, the condition of inductive equivalence is often relaxed. In this section, we investigate inductive equivalence in some Horn ILP systems which are widely studied in the literature.
FOIL
FOIL (Quinlan 1990 ) induces function-free definite clauses which cover a positive observation and uncover a negative observation together with a background theory. Given a predicate p to be learned, it starts with the fact p(x 1 , . . . , x n ) ← which is then specialized using refinement operators that adds new literals to the body of the clause. FOIL repeatedly applies a refinement operator until the clause does not imply any fact included in a negative observation for the predicate. Once a clause is added to a hypothesis, every ground fact implied by that clause is deleted from a positive observation. The algorithm repeats the step until all facts in a positive observation are covered. FOIL uses an information-based heuristic to guide its search for hypotheses.
The logic for induction in FOIL is explanatory induction with a restricted problem setting. Given a function-free definite logic program B (called a Datalog) and a set O of ground facts, a hypothesis H covers O with respect to B in FOIL if
where H is a set of function-free definite clauses satisfying the condition 3 :
H = {C | the predicate appearing in the head of a clause C appears in O}.
The declarative semantics of a definite logic program B is given by the unique minimal model M B , called the least model. The least model has the model intersection property (Van Emden and Kowalski 1976) 
Thus, the relation (3) is rewritten as
where M B∪H is the least model of B ∪ H . Note that B ∪ H is a definite logic program and is always consistent. By this fact, inductive equivalence in FOIL is defined as follows. 
GOLEM
GOLEM (Muggleton and Feng 1990) realizes explanatory induction in definite logic programs. It uses the algorithm of relative least generalization under subsumption (Plotkin 1971) . We first review basic terms and results. A clause C 1 subsumes another clause C 2 relative to a program B, denoted by C 1 B C 2 , if there is a substitution θ such that B |= C 1 θ → C 2 . A clause D is a relative least generalization under subsumption (rlgs) of C 1 and C 2 with respect to B if D is the least upper bound of C 1 and C 2 under the ordering B over the clausal language. The rlgs does not always exist but exists when B is a set of ground atoms (Nienhuys-Cheng and De Wolf 1997).
Given a definite logic program B and a set O of ground facts, GOLEM constructs a hypothesis H as follows:
At this point, GOLEM replaces B with the conjunction of ground atoms included in a finite subset of the least model M B of B. For simplicity reasons, we suppose that the least model M B is finite and replace B with M B . Let O = {A 1 , . . . , A k }. Then, 
which is a set of definite clauses.
Inductive equivalence in GOLEM is now defined as follows. , O) . Hence, the result holds. 
flies(x) ← bird(x).
This means that the first clause of B 1 is of no use for induction in GOLEM. Note that B 1 and B 2 are weakly equivalent, but they are not logically equivalent.
In the process of constructing inductive hypothesis H , GOLEM approximates B to a finite subset of M B . However, rlgs(B, O) = rlgs(M B , O) in general. In fact, in Example 4.2, given O = {has_wing(joe)}, the hypothesis H = {bird(joe)} is obtained in B 1 but not in B 2 . This means that some hypotheses which are computed under rlgs might be lost by GOLEM.
PROGOL
PROGOL is also known as a Horn ILP system which realizes explanatory induction. It is based on the inverse entailment algorithm developed in Muggleton (1995) Inductive equivalence in PROGOL is defined as follows. In PROGOL, weak equivalence of two programs is not sufficient for inductive equivalence.
Example 4.3 Consider two programs:
white_swan(c) ←}.
Given the observation O = ← black_swan(c), it becomes ¬ bot(B 1 , O) = white_swan(c) ∧ black_swan(c).
Then,
becomes a hypothesis satisfying H 1 |= bot (B 1 , E) . By contrast,
¬ bot(B 2 , O) = white_swan(c) ∧ black_swan(c) ∧ abnormal(c).
becomes a hypothesis satisfying H 2 |= bot(B 2 , E). Note that B 1 ≡ B 2 but B 1 ≡ w B 2 .
CLAUDIEN
The system CLAUDIEN (De Raedt and Bruynooghe 1993; De Raedt and Dehaspe 1997b) realizes descriptive induction under the completion semantics (Clark 1978) . Given a definite logic program B and a set O of definite clauses, CLAUDIEN produces a set H of clauses satisfying
Comp(B ∪ O) |= H
where Comp represents Clark's predicate completion.
Example 4.4 Let B = {human(s)} and O = {mortal(s)}. Then, the following clauses are all possible solutions:
Note that in descriptive induction it is assumed that the universe defined by an observation together with a background theory is completely specified (De Raedt and Lavrač 1993). The results of Sect. 4 are summarized in Table 1 . Observe that the conditions of inductive equivalence in FOIL and GOLEM are weaker than the condition of inductive equivalence in explanatory induction (Theorem 3.2). This is due to the fact that these systems impose some restrictions on the syntax of background theories, observations and hypotheses. By contrast, the condition of inductive equivalence in PROGOL and CLAUDIEN is identical to the one in clausal logic.
Inductive equivalence in nonmonotonic logic programs
Nonmonotonic logic programs
Nonmonotonic logic programs are logic programs with negation as failure (Baral and Gelfond 1994) . We consider the class of extended disjunctive programs (Gelfond and Lifschitz 1991) in this paper. An extended disjunctive program (EDP) (or simply a program) is a set of rules of the form:
where each L i is a positive/negative literal, i.e., A or ¬A for an atom A, and not is negation as failure (NAF). not L is called an NAF-literal. The symbol ";" represents disjunction.
The left-hand side of "←" is the head, and the right-hand side is the body. A primary difference between nonmonotonic logic programs and clausal theories is that a rule (4) is not a clause even if it contains no NAF-literal. For instance, a rule L 1 ← L 2 has meaning different from ¬L 2 ← ¬L 1 or L 1 ∨ ¬L 2 . The rule (4) is interpreted as an inference rule rather than an implication formula (Gelfond and Lifschitz 1991) . Thus, induction in nonmonotonic logic programs is different from induction in clausal theories.
The semantics of an EDP is defined by the answer set semantics (Gelfond and Lifschitz 1991) . The literal base Lit is the set of all ground literals in the language of a program. Suppose a program P and a set of literals S(⊆ Lit). Then, the reduct P S is the program which contains the ground rule head(r) ← body + (r) iff there is a rule r in ground(P ) such that body − (r) ∩ S = ∅. Given a basic program P , let S be a set of ground literals that is (i) closed under P , i.e., for every ground rule r in ground(P ), body(r) ⊆ S implies head(r)∩ S = ∅; and (ii) logically closed, i.e., it is either consistent or equal to Lit. An answer set of a basic program P is a minimal set S satisfying both (i) and (ii). Given an EDP P and a set S of ground literals, S is an answer set of P if S is an answer set of P S . A program has none, one, or multiple answer sets in general. The set of all answer sets of P is written as AS(P ). Here AS(P ) is an antichain set, i.e., no element S ∈ AS(P ) is a proper subset of another element T ∈ AS(P ). An answer set is consistent if it is not Lit. A program P is consistent if it has a consistent answer set; otherwise, P is inconsistent. In normal logic programs, answer sets are also called stable models (Gelfond and Lifschitz 1988) . A set S of ground literals satisfies a ground rule r if either S ∩ head(r) = ∅, body
When a rule r contains variables, S satisfies r if S satisfies every ground instance of r. S satisfies a set R of rules if S satisfies every rule in R. A program P satisfies a set R of rules if every answer set of P satisfies every rule in R. A program P is consistent if it has an answer set; otherwise P is inconsistent.
Example 5.1 Let P be the program:
where AS(P ) = {{p(a), r(a)}, {q(a), r(a)}}. Then, every answer set satisfies the rule p(a) ; q(a) ←, while p(a) ← r(a) is satisfied by {p(a), r(a)}, but not by {q(a), r(a)}.
Inductive equivalence between EDPs
Four different induction frameworks in Sect. 2.2 are applied to induction in nonmonotonic logic programs. In this section, we consider the following problem setting: -a background theory B is given as an EDP under the answer set semantics SEM(B) = AS(B) -an observation O is a set of rules -a hypothesis H is a set of rules Note that in case of nonmonotonic logic programs, a background theory B could be inconsistent. In this case, the introduction of H to B makes B ∪ H consistent. This is the difference from the case of monotonic background theories. In case of monotonic theories, an inconsistent B cannot become consistent by introducing any H . In each case, we say that a hypothesis H covers (or explains) O with respect to B under the answer set semantics in the induction framework I . Here, I is one of the four induction frameworks presented above.
Next we provide a program transformation which is useful for subsequent discussion. Given a set O of ground rules, any rule r in O is transformed to the set of rules:
where G r is a new ground atom appearing nowhere in B and uniquely associated with each r. With this setting, the next result holds.
Proposition 5.1 O is satisfied by an answer set of B ∪ H iff for any r ∈ O, G r is included in an answer set of B ∪ H ∪ .
Proof O is satisfied by an answer set S of B ∪ H iff for any r in O, either S ∩ head(r) = ∅, body
Thus, any observation O as a set of rules is instantiated to its ground instances ground(O), which is then transformed to a semantically equivalent observation as a set of ground atoms.
Proposition 5.2 (Relations between different inductive equivalences)
The following relations hold between equivalence relations in different induction.
Proof The results (1) and (3) (2) presents that the notions of inductive equivalence in brave induction and learning from satisfiability coincide under the answer set semantics.
We proceed to build conditions for inductive equivalence between EDPs. Conversely, suppose that B 1 and B 2 are inductively equivalent in cautious induction. Then, it holds that O is satisfied in every answer set of B 1 ∪ H iff O is satisfied in every answer set of B 2 ∪ H for any O and any H such that B 1 ∪ H and B 2 ∪ H are consistent. Suppose that there is a set S such that S ∈ AS(
For some non-empty finite subset of U ⊆ U and V ⊆ V , construct the constraint
where U or V is identified with the conjunction of literals included in each set. By U ⊆ S and V ∩ S = ∅, S does not satisfy C.
If every answer set T i of B 2 ∪ H satisfies C, this contradicts the assumption that B 1 and B 2 are inductively equivalent. Else if some answer set T i of B 2 ∪ H does not satisfy C, U ⊆ T i and V ∩ T i = ∅. For every such T i , either S \ T i = ∅ or T i \ S = ∅ holds by S ∈ AS(B 2 ∪ H ). For every T i satisfying S \ T i = ∅, take one literal L i from S \ T i and collect such a literal from each T i . Put the collection as W 1 :
5 At the moment, the result is open when a program has an infinite number of answer sets. Similarly, for every T i satisfying T i \ S = ∅, take one literal L i from T i \ S and collect such a literal from each T i . Put the collection as W 2 :
Here, W 1 and W 2 are finite set, because B 2 ∪ H has a finite number of answer sets. Suppose the constraint Proof When B 1 and B 2 are inductively equivalent in brave induction, it holds that O is satisfied in an answer set of B 1 ∪ H iff O is satisfied in an answer set of B 2 ∪ H for any O and any H such that B 1 ∪ H and B 2 ∪ H are consistent. Then, for any set O of ground literals, O ⊆ S for an answer set S of 
Inductive equivalence in nonmonotonic ILP systems
In this section, we investigate inductive equivalence in two nonmonotonic ILP systems.
Induction of stable models
Otero (2001) characterizes induction problems in normal logic programs (NLPs) under the stable model semantics. Recall that an NLP is a set of rules of the form:
where each A i is an atom. Answer sets coincide with stable models in NLPs, so that Otero's framework is considered a special case of induction under the answer set semantics. Otero introduces different types of induction for positive/negative observations, but here we consider the so-called induction from non-complete sets which is the usual ILP setting for positive observations. Since AS(B) ⊆ MonMod(B), the above result implies that inductive equivalence in ISM does not require the condition of strong nor weak equivalence. It is worth noting that induction in ISM can be reformulated using classical logic. Given an NLP B, consider a clausal theory Cl(B) which is obtained from B by replacing every NAF-literal not A in (5) with a negative literal ¬ A. Then, monotonic models of B coincide with Herbrand models of Cl (B) . Thus, the inductive equivalence in ISM is translated into the problem of inductive equivalence under the classical semantics, and Theorem 5.8 implies that Sakama and Inoue (2009b) introduce an algorithm for brave induction in nonmonotonic logic programs. Given a background theory B as an EDP and a set O of ground literals as an observation, the algorithm BRAIN not computes a set H of rules as a hypothesis. Before presenting an algorithm, a couple of notions are in order. Given a literal L, pred(L) and const(L) represent the predicate of L and the constants appearing in L, respectively. Let L 0 be a ground literal and S a set of ground literals. Then, BRAIN not constructs hypotheses in the following two steps. 6 First, for a consistent answer set S of B, construct a finite and consistent set R S of ground rules satisfying the following conditions. For any rule r ∈ R S , 1. head(r) ⊆ O and for any L ∈ O, there is a rule r ∈ R S such that head(r) = {L}, 2. body + (r) ⊆ P where P = {L | L ∈ S and L is relevant to the literal in head(r)},
Brave induction from answer sets
and L is relevant to the literal in head(r) and appears in ground(B)} where = {L | L ∈ Lit and pred(L) appears in O}. In the second and third conditions, we put body + (r) = P and body − (r) = N if P and N are finite sets. Second, for the set R S of rules obtained as above, R S is partitioned as R S = R 1 ∪ · · · ∪ R n where each R i (1 ≤ i ≤ n) is a comparable set of ground rules. Then, the least generalization under subsumption of each R i is computed and collected as 7 lgs(R S ) = {lgs(R 1 ), . . . , lgs(R n )}.
lgs(R S ) is a solution of brave induction if B ∪ lgs(R S ) is consistent.
Example 5.4 Suppose the background theory B:
which has four answer sets:
Given the observation O = {charged(a), charged(b)}, the set of ground rules
is constructed using the answer set S 1 . The lgs of R S 1 becomes
By the definition, different hypotheses are constructed by different answer sets. Now we define inductive equivalence in BRAIN not as follows. Proof Suppose two ground programs B 1 and B 2 which are not strongly equivalent. Put O = {L} such that L appears nowhere in B 1 , but B 2 contains the constraint ← L. With this setting, for some answer set S of B 1 , R S includes a rule r such that head(r) = L, body + (r) ⊆ S and body − (r) ∩ S = ∅. Also, for some answer set T of B 2 , R T includes a rule r such that head(r) = L, body + (r) ⊆ T and body − (r) ∩ T = ∅. In this case, however, B 1 ∪ R S is consistent, but B 2 ∪ R T is inconsistent. Hence, B 1 and B 2 are not inductively equivalent. The converse implication clearly holds.
Discussion
Comparison of conditions for inductive equivalence
The results of this paper are summarized in Table 2 . When the representation language is clausal logic, logical equivalence is necessary and sufficient for inductive equivalence between two background theories in each induction under both classical and the minimal From the computational viewpoint, testing strong equivalence of propositional EDPs is converted to the problem of propositional entailment in classical logic (Lin 2002) . The problem of testing strong equivalence is then solved using existing SAT solvers. For predicate programs with a finite domain, testing strong equivalence is also possible by instantiating a program into a finite propositional one. There is a system for testing strong equivalence of function-free finite nonmonotonic logic programs (Janhunen and Oikarinen 2004) . Existence of no procedure for testing strong equivalence of logic programs with functions would restrict practical application of inductive equivalence in ILP. Nevertheless, inductive equivalence is efficiently testable when background theories are given as function-free finite Horn logic program (or Datalog) or a database that is a collection of propositional sentences.
6.2 Relation to abductive equivalence Inoue and Sakama (2005 , 2006a , 2006b 
The former compares explainability of observations in different background theories, while the latter compares explanation contents of observations. Explanatory equivalence is stronger than explainable equivalence, and the former implies the latter. The paper introduces two equivalence notions for first-order abduction and abductive logic programming (ALP), and the paper (Inoue and Sakama 2006a) applies the notion to extended abduction of . The paper (Inoue and Sakama 2006b ) also argues equivalence between minimal explanations.
Comparing , 2006a , 2006b ) with our present work, some interesting connections are observed. When underlying logic is first-order logic, logical equivalence of two theories is a necessary and sufficient condition for explanatory equivalence in abduction. When a background theory is represented by a nonmonotonic logic program, on the other hand, B 1 , A 1 and B 2 , A 2 are explanatorily equivalent iff B 1 and B 2 are strongly equivalent. Those results have connection to the results of Theorems 3.3, 3.7, and 5.4 of this paper. However, there are some important differences between the previous studies on abductive equivalence and the results of this paper. First, the framework of ALP in Inoue and Sakama (2005 , 2006a , 2006b ) characterizes equivalence relations in brave abduction. That is, given a logic program B, a hypothesis H explains an observation G if G is true in an answer set of B ∪ H . This paper characterizes the problem of inductive equivalence not only in brave induction, but also in other forms of induction. Second, in abductive frameworks a hypothesis space A is prespecified as abducibles and possible explanations for a given observation are constructed as a subset of abducibles. The existence of A in abductive logic programs results in characterization by relative strong equivalence, i.e., two programs B 1 and B 2 are explanatory equivalent iff they are strongly equivalent with respect to A. Moreover, in abductive logic programming, abducibles and observations are usually restricted to (ground) literals. In ILP, on the other hand, hypotheses and observations are general rules rather than facts. Besides these differences, both abduction and induction require strong equivalence of two (nonmonotonic) logic programs to identify the results of abductive/inductive inference. The essence of this lies in the fact that abduction and induction are both ampliative reasoning and extend theories. Strong equivalence takes the influence of addition of a rule set to each program into account, so that it succeeds in characterizing the effect of abduction/induction that are not captured by weak equivalence of programs. In Lifschitz et al. (2001) , it is argued that strong equivalence is useful to simplify a part of a program without looking at the other parts. On the other hand, a series of studies , 2006a , 2006b ) and the result of this paper reveal that strong equivalence has another important applications for testing equivalence of background theories in abductive and inductive logic programming.
Program development in ILP
As presented in Sect. 4, there are many ILP systems which handle Horn logic programs as background theories. In Horn logic programs, program transformations which preserve weak equivalence of programs are popularly used for optimizing programs. Partial evaluation or unfold/fold transformations are of this kind (Tamaki and Sato 1984; Pettorossi and Proietti 1994) . For instance, given the program On the other hand, in B 2 folding the first clause by the second one results in the program B 1 . B 1 and B 2 have the same least model thereby weakly equivalent, but not logically equivalent. In ILP, unfolding is often used as an operator for specialization (Boström and IdestamAlmquist 1994) , and folding is used as an operator for generalization under the name of inverse resolution (Muggleton and Buntine 1992) .
In Sect. 3.2 we observe that logical equivalence of two clausal theories is necessary and sufficient to guarantee inductive equivalence under the minimal model semantics. Since weak equivalence provides a weaker condition than logical equivalence (Proposition 2.3), the condition of weak equivalence of two clausal theories is not sufficient for preserving inductive equivalence under the minimal model semantics in general. This result brings an important implication in program development in ILP that basic program transformations, such as unfold/fold transformations, are not applicable for optimizing background theories in ILP. If used, those transformations change solutions of induction in general. In the above example, B 1 and B 2 are not inductively equivalent in explanatory induction as H = {q(a) ←} explains p(a) in B 1 but does not in B 2 . Nevertheless, those transformations are still effective as far as one uses induction algorithms that require the condition of weak equivalence. In Sect. 4, we observe that FOIL and GOLEM are of this kind, but PROGOL and CLAUDIEN are not. It is also known that unfold/fold transformations do not preserve strong equivalence of nonmonotonic logic programs (Osorio et al. 2001) , so that those transformations cannot be used for program optimization in nonmonotonic ILP without changing solutions in general.
Verification of algorithms
If an induction algorithm produces different hypotheses from two different background theories, those theories are considered to be inductively inequivalent. It may happen, however, that some algorithm may produce different hypotheses from two background theories due to its incompleteness/incorrectness. If two strongly equivalent programs induce different hypotheses in face of some observation, it indicates that the induction algorithm is incomplete or incorrect. In this way, inductive equivalence would be used for testing correctness/completeness of induction algorithms. We consider that any induction algorithm should compute the same hypotheses from two different background theories as far as they are inductively equivalent. With this regard, inductive equivalence has an application to verification of induction algorithms.
For another application, inductive equivalence would be used for comparing capabilities of different induction algorithms. Let α(B, O) be the set of hypotheses induced by an algorithm α using a background theory B and an observation O. For two different induction algorithms α 1 and α 2 under a common problem setting, suppose that α 1 (B 1 , O) = α 1 (B 2 , O) implies α 2 (B 1 , O) = α 2 (B 2 , O), but not vice versa. In this case, α 1 is considered inductively more sensitive than α 2 in the sense that α 1 may distinguish different background theories that are not distinguished by α 2 . For instance, suppose any ground Horn logic program B and any set O of ground atoms. In this problem setting, we can say that PRO-GOL is inductively more sensitive than GOLEM, since bot(B 1 , E) = bot(B 2 , O) implies rlgs(M B 1 , O) = rlgs(M B 2 , O) but not vice versa. (This is due to the fact that B 1 ≡ B 2 implies B 1 ≡ w B 2 but not vice versa.) Thus, inductive equivalence is also useful for evaluating capabilities of induction algorithms.
Concluding remarks
This paper has studied equivalence issues in induction and inductive logic programming. We introduced the notion of inductive equivalence which compares hypotheses that explain observations with respect to different background theories. Two different logics for representation languages -clausal theories and nonmonotonic logic programming, and four different frameworks of induction -cautious induction, brave induction, learning from satisfiability, and descriptive induction, were considered. The results of this paper show that logical equivalence is necessary and sufficient for inductive equivalence in clausal theories, while strong equivalence is necessary and sufficient in nonmonotonic extended disjunctive programs. On the other hand, we also observed that existing Horn ILP systems sometimes require weaker conditions of equivalence under restricted problem settings. We addressed that inductive equivalence has potential applications for verification and evaluation of induction algorithms. We also argued that program transformations which are popularly used in logic programming generally do not preserve inductive equivalence of programs. This is an important caution for program development in ILP which has been receiving little attention in the field.
Inductive equivalence considered in this paper guarantees coincidence of every hypothesis induced by different background theories. In practice, however, the exact coincidence of whole hypotheses is not always requested and one may be interested in preserving some preferred hypotheses. The criteria of preference of hypothesis depends on applications and it is often specified under the name of induction bias. In the context of abduction, preferred hypotheses are referred to "best explanations". In Inoue and Sakama (2006b) , it is proved that two abductive theories are explanatory equivalent iff they have the same minimal explanations for any observation. Sakama and Inoue (1995) introduce several program transformations which preserve best explanations in abductive logic programming. Inductive equivalence of preferred hypotheses and program transformations for preserving those hypotheses are left for future research.
